Transnational Administration and Cross-Subsidy Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Crisis Resource Allocation Beyond the Covid-19

Abstract

This article addresses the disconnect between normative prescriptions for transnational administration and the operational realities of crisis resource allocation. It asks why cross-border solidarity mechanisms failed during COVID-19 and what conceptual architecture might make them more adaptive in future emergencies. The study develops a Global Cross-Subsidy Policy (GCSP) framework through a qualitative meta-synthesis of 71 interdisciplinary sources published between 1996 and 2026. The analysis identifies three conditions under which cross-subsidy logics operate transnationally: (1) a clear cost-transfer mechanism that shifts resources from surplus to deficit units, (2) an identifiable public-good rationale beyond emergency charity, and (3) institutional channels capable of executing transfers without reproducing donor–recipient hierarchies. Applied to fisheries reform, energy assistance, and vaccine financing, these criteria reveal that pandemic-era measures rarely constituted cross-subsidies in the strict economic sense; most were ad hoc fiscal transfers or market interventions. The article argues that a GCSP is conceptually defensible only as a modular framework combining legal carve-outs, data interoperability standards, and community-embedded evaluation rather than as a unified global fund. The framework’s contribution lies in specifying the boundary conditions under which cross-subsidy principles can be translated from domestic regulatory economics to transnational crisis governance; its principal limitation is reliance on secondary sources and the absence of primary empirical validation.